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Abstract
Financial intermediation and bank spreads are important elements in the analy-
sis of business cycle transmission and monetary policy. We present a simple frame-
work that introduces lending relationships, a relevant feature of nancial interme-
diation that has been so far neglected in the monetary economics literature, into a
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with staggered prices and cost chan-
nels. Our main ndings are: (i) banking spreads move countercyclically generating
amplied output responses, (ii) spread movements are important for monetary pol-
icy making even when a standard Taylor Rule is employed (iii) modifying the policy
rule to include a banking spread adjustment improves stabilization of shocks and
increases welfare when compared to rules that only respond to output gap and in-
ation, and nally (iv) the presence of strong lending relationships in the banking
sector can lead to indeterminacy of equilibrium forcing the central bank to react to
spread movements.
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1. Introduction
Currently, there is a revived interest in the impact of imperfect credit markets on business
cycles and monetary policy analysis. There are three main approaches in the existing
literature. The rst approach focuses on the inclusion of a banking sector that produces
loans and deposits, following Goodfriend and McCallum (2007). The second approach
focuses on the costly state verication of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). The third approach, the closest to ours, looks at intro-
ducing imperfect competition in the banking sector, either building on the Salop circular
model (Andres and Arce (2009) and Andres, Arce, and Thomas (2010)) or exploring
entry and exit into niche markets (Mandelman (2010)). To the best of our knowledge,
monetary policy implications of the market power in nancial intermediation that takes
the form of relationship lending has received only limited attention.
Lending relationships are directly aimed at resolving problems of asymmetric infor-
mation as identied by Diamond (1984). In order to obtain better borrowing terms a rm
might nd optimal to reveal to its bank proprietary information that is not available to
the nancial market at large. Banks will have the incentive to invest in acquiring infor-
mation about a borrower in order to build a lasting and protable association. That way,
the information ow between banks and rms improve, increasing the added value of a
lending relationship (see amongst others, Boot (2000) and Petersen and Rajan (1994)).
On the other hand, as pointed by Rajan (1992), such relationships also have a (hold-up)
cost. After a relationship is formed banks gain an information monopoly that increases
their bargaining power over rms. Santos and Winton (2008), using data from the US
credit market, show that banking spreads can increase up to 95 basis points in a recession
due to the fact that banks exploit this informational advantage after relationships are
formed. Hence, banking spread movements driven by the existence of these relationships
are signicant and add to the \bank channel" eect of business cycle transmission and
monetary policy. Figure 1 shows the loan spread to federal fund rate in the US. It is clear
that spreads tend to increase sharply during recessions (1991, 2001 and 2007). Although
the loan spreads in the survey includes both banking and credit spreads, by using the
same dataset, Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero (2011) show that the evidence of countercyclical
banking spreads remains when credit spread changes are controlled for.
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[Insert Figure 1 about here]
The hold-up or locked-in problem is also emphasized by the European Commission
report on the banking sector (European Commission (2007)). They conclude that com-
petition problems within the industry are exacerbated as a result of information asymme-
tries between banks and their customers, which contribute to increasing switching costs.
Furthermore, studies based on micro data point to a strong presence of lending relation-
ships. For instance, Kim, Kliger, and Vale (2003) report that the duration of a lending
relationship in Norway is about 13.5 years; Angelini, Di Salvo, and Ferri (1998), focusing
on Italy, nd an average duration of 14 years; Petersen and Rajan (1994) estimate an
average duration of 11 years for the US, and Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) obtain
an average duration of 7.8 years for Belgium. See also Degryse and Ongena (2008) and
references therein for a survey of further empirical evidence of the positive link between
lending relationships and banking spreads and prots.1
The primary objective of the present paper is to understand the implications of lend-
ing relationships on credit market outcomes, economic activity and particularly on mon-
etary policy making. We therefore develop a parsimonious model that captures this key
credit market channel in an otherwise standard New Keynesian model with investment.
We introduce endogenous banking spreads determined by the banks' prot margin which
in turn is determined by the strength of lending relationships. Firms must borrow to
pay for the capital input and salaries, thus they are subject to cost channels of mone-
tary transmission. Therefore, our model incorporates a bank channel or cost channel as
in Ravenna and Walsh (2006) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), however,
these models assume perfect competition and hence, the bank interest rate is equal to the
Central Bank base rate. We assume that each rm selects a set of banks to acquire loans
with an inherent preference to continue borrowing from those banks that issued loans
in the previous period. This preference introduces an implicit switching cost, reecting
informational asymmetries with other lenders/borrowers. We do not explicitly formalize
the hold-up problem. We model lending relationships by adopting Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe,
and Uribe's (2006) \deep habits". Lending relationships, thus, imply that a fraction of
loan demand is inelastic and determined by the previous loan share of banks. Note that,
1Note that we use the terms `banking spread' and `banking mark-up' interchangeably throughout the
paper.
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in a parallel research to ours, Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero (2010) study a real business cycle
model and incorporate lending relationships based on deep habits similar to the one pre-
sented here. They establish that countercyclical bank prot margins amplify the impact
of productivity shocks. In the current paper, however, we study implications of lending
relationships for the analysis of the monetary policy, focusing particularly on the im-
pact of endogenous markup on interest rate setting, Taylor Rules and the indeterminacy
properties of the augmented New Keynesian model.
In line with the empirical evidence presented by Santos and Winton (2008), Aliaga-
Diaz and Olivero (2011) and Mandelman (2006), our model generates countercyclical
banking spreads due to the existence of lending relationships. When output and loan
demand are high, banks are willing to decrease the banking spread to form as many
relationships as possible. That reects the fact that banks recognize that higher current
demand leads to higher future loan demand. However, as output decreases, banks exploit
the relationships already formed by increasing the prot margin, therefore increasing
banking spreads. We show that the cyclical properties of banking spreads lead to three
main results.
First, given an initial shock that reduces output, banking spreads tend to increase.
Loan interest rates, which are part of the rm's current marginal and capital investment
costs, also increase. As a result, investment and total production decrease further leading
to an amplication of the output response. This result is similar in nature to the nancial
accelerator proposed by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). In our model, the
amplication arises due to lending relationships, particularly via investment nance,
while in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) this arises due to movements in rms'
net worth.
Second, our analysis sheds light on the eects of endogenous banking spreads on mon-
etary policymaking. We initially assume that the Central Bank base rate only responds
to ination and output, employing a standard Taylor Rule. Although not directly, the
base rate responds to spread changes given its impact on output and ination. To show
this, we compare the propagation of dierent shocks in our model with respect to a case
with a constant spread. For instance, we nd that, in the case of an ination shock,
the spread increases by around 100 basis points. Here, the base rate response is about
50 basis points lower compared to the model with constant spreads. The policymaker,
being aware of potential movements in the banking spread, will react to the shock with a
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subdued response, as spread movements reinforce the eects of monetary policy. There-
fore, our results are in line with the literature on banking and monetary policy (see
Goodfriend and McCallum (2007)). We hence conclude that ignoring the eects of bank-
ing sector characteristics on monetary policy could lead to sub-optimal policy responses.
Following Taylor (2008) we verify whether a spread-adjusted monetary policy improves
stabilization. We nd that responding directly to spread movements may curb the out-
put amplication observed in the presence of lending relationships without increasing
inationary pressures. We also show that when banking spreads are endogenous, the
policymaker's response to spread movements leads to an improvement in welfare.
Third, the stronger the lending relationships, the higher the banking spread response
will be to an initial shock in output and loan demand. Higher banking spreads further
dampen loan demand, leading to a new round of banking spread adjustments. If banking
spreads are volatile enough, the economy does not have a unique local rational expec-
tations equilibrium. This feature is directly related to the fact banks react not only to
current but also to expected future evolution of the loan demand. We argue that self
fullling prophecies are possible since interest rates in the economy are aected by the
future evolution of loan demand. However, the Central Bank could avoid the indetermi-
nacy problem by implementing a spread-adjusted Taylor Rule to oset the destabilizing
eects of endogenous banking spread. In other words, if sharp banking spread changes
are matched by base rate cuts, the nal loan interest rate does not increase as much
and the output-banking spread spiral that leads to indeterminacy does not occur. This
result indicates that not only stabilization but also determinacy should be a concern for
monetary policy in economies where competition in the banking sector is imperfect and
lending relationships are present.
As mentioned earlier, there is a recently growing literature on novel ways of introduc-
ing imperfect competition in the banking sector into a standard New Keynesian frame-
work. A recent interesting paper by Andres and Arce (2009), for instance, develops a
model with monopoly power in the loans market in the spirit of the Salop circular model.
They are able to replicate countercyclical spreads, although their main focus is on the
eect of banking competition on collateral and house prices. Another interesting paper
is the one by Mandelman (2010). He develops a DSGE model with entry and exit in the
banking sector that allows for sustainable collusive loan rate increases (decreases) during
recessions (booms). This collusive behavior magnies the nancial accelerator impact
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of shocks next to balance sheet channels. The mechanism, however, relies on entry and
exit, which although relevant in emerging markets, might not be as signicant in more
stable banking markets where sizeable market shares are held by larger nancial insti-
tutions. Finally, Hulsewig, Mayer, and Wollmershuser (2007) and Teranishi (2008) also
focus on the characteristics of the banking sector on a model of cost channel similar to
ours. However, their main assumption is that loan contracts are changed in a staggered
fashion. Without further complications this type of models are not able to generate
countercyclical banking mark-ups.
The paper's outline is as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In section 3 we
begin by presenting the equilibrium conditions and then focus on the linearized system
of equations and the parameters used in the numerical analysis. Section 4 presents the
model's main dynamic properties and the results of our policy experiments. Section 5
considers the determinacy properties of our model economy. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. Model
The economy consists of a representative household, a representative nal good rm, a
continuum of intermediate good rms i 2 [0; 1], a continuum of banks j 2 [0; 1] and a
Central Bank.
2.1 Households
The household maximizes the discounted lifetime utility given by
max
Ct;Mt+1;Dt;Ht;
Et
1X
t=0
t
 
C1 t
1     
H1+t
1 + 
!
;  2 (0; 1) ;  > 0 (1)
where Ct denotes the household's total consumption and Ht denotes hours worked. The
curvature parameters ;  are strictly positive.  is the discount factor. The household
faces the following budget and cash in advance constraints
Ct +
Dt
Pt
+
Mdt+1
Pt
6 WtHt
Pt
+
Rt;CBDt
Pt
+
Mt
Pt
+
R 1
0
i;tdi
Pt
+
R 1
0
Bt;jdj
Pt
(2)
Ct +
Dt
Pt
6 Mt
Pt
+
Wt
Pt
Ht (3)
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whereMdt+1 are money holdings carried over to period t+1,
R 1
0
i;tdi represents dividends
accrued from the intermediate producers to households,
R 1
0
Bt;jdi represents prots of the
banks accrued to the household, and nally Rt;CB is the rate of return on deposits Dt.
We assume the Central Bank sets Rt;CB directly according to a monetary policy rule
to be specied. Although not modeled here, this is equivalent to allowing households to
buy government assets, which pay a return rate equal to Rt;CB , as well as making bank
deposits. Assuming no arbitrage conditions, the deposit rate would be equal to Rt;CB .
The cash-in-advance constraint imposes the condition that the household needs to
allocate money balances and labour earnings for consumption net of the deposits it has
decided to allocate to the nancial intermediary. This specication implies that the
labour supply is not aected by real balances (see Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992)).
Another important assumption regards the timing of deposits, which aects the evolution
of consumption. We assume deposits are paid back in the same period (intra-period
deposits) in order to avoid real balance frictions related to consumption in the money
market.
2.2 Firms
The nal good representative rm produces goods combining a continuum of intermediate
goods i 2 [0; 1] with the following production function
Yt =
Z 1
0
y
" 1
"
i;t
 "
" 1
: (4)
As standard this implies a demand function given by
yi;t =

Pit
Pt
 "
Yt; (5)
where the aggregate price level is
Pt =
Z 1
0
P 1 "i;t
 1
1 "
: (6)
The intermediate sector is composed of a continuum of rms i 2 [0; 1] producing
dierentiated goods with the following constant returns to scale production function
yi;t = K

i;tH
1 
i;t ; (7)
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where Ki is the capital stock and Hi is the labour used in production. Each rm hires
labour and invests in capital. It is assumed that the rm must borrow money to pay for
these expenses.
To characterize the problem of intermediate rms, we split their decision into a pricing
decision given their real marginal cost, the production decision to minimize costs and a
nancial decision of allocation of bank loans.
Following the standard Calvo pricing scheme, rm i, when allowed, sets prices Pi;t
according to
max
Pi;t
Et
( 1X
s=0
Pt+sQt;t+s!
syi;t+s

Pi;t
Pt+s
  t+s;i
)
; (8)
subject to the demand function (5), where Qt;t+s is the economy's stochastic discount
factor, dened in the next section and t+s;i is the rm's i real marginal cost at time
t + s. To obtain the real marginal cost, we need to solve the rm's intertemporal cost
minimization problem. That is
min
Ki;t+1;Hi;t
Et
( 1X
t=0
Q0;t (Rt;iWtHi;t +Rt;iPtIi;t)
)
; (9)
subject to the production function (7) and investment equation Ii;t = Ki;t+1   (1  
)Ki;t; where Wt is the nominal wage, and Ri;t the index of rates charged by the banks
in the economy for the loan made by rm i in period t, to be paid in t+1. Finally, Ptt;i
is the multiplier of the constraint (7).
Expression Rt;iWtHi;t+Rt;iPtIi;t in the cost minimization problem characterizes the
costs of rms given that they need to borrow to nance wage and investment payments2.
The model incorporates the cost channel of labour and investment: marginal costs of
the rms are aected by the banks interest rate. Although cost channels are not a
basic feature of New Keynesian models, the labour cost channel has been introduced
by, amongst others, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Ravenna and Walsh
(2006), while all costly state verication models, e.g. Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1999), assume cost channel on investment. Ravenna and Walsh (2006) and Barth and
Ramey (2001) present corroborating econometric evidence for the direct (costly) inuence
of monetary policy on the U.S. ination adjustment equation. Furthermore, Mayer and
2In Aksoy, Basso, and Coto-Martinez (2011), we considered a NKM to study the transmission of
the monetary policy through the labour and capital cost channel, our results are robust to altering the
intensity of one or both transmission channels.
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Sussman (2004) report empirical evidence that US rms rely on debt relative to equity
in nancing investment implying the presence of investment cost channel in monetary
transmission.
The rm takes loans to pay for production costs, thus the loan payment clearing
condition is given by
Z 1
0
Rt;i;jLt;i;jdj = Rt;iWtHi;t +Rt;iPtIi;t: (10)
The nancial department of the rm decides how to raise the total funds needed to
pay the production costs from the continuum of banks j 2 [0; 1]3. We assume the rm
establishes relationships with the banks that have issued loans to the rm in the previous
period. Although we do not explicitly model the benets of a relationship, a simple way
of motivating them is the potential reduction in the cost of providing information for
bank credit ratings (see Boot (2000))4. In order to formally incorporate this relationship
that translates into a bank switching cost in a simple way, we follow Ravn, Schmitt-
Grohe, and Uribe (2006) and assume the nancial part of the rm cares about a measure
Xt;i of loans given by
5
Xt;i =
Z 1
0
(Lt;i;j   Lt 1;j)1 
1
% dj
 1
1  1
%
: 0 <  < 1
The problem of the nancial department of the rm is
min
Lt;i;j
Z 1
0
Rt;i;jLt;i;jdj
s:t:
Z 1
0
(Lt;i;j   Lt 1;j)1 
1
% dj
 1
1  1
%
= Xt;i:
As standard the interest rate index of the loans made by the rm across all banks j
3Note that we could assume that each rm i borrows from a fraction [i; #i] of banks. Results would
remain the same given that there are innite rms and banks in the continuum [0; 1].
4Here, we follow rich evidence provided by Detragiache, Garella, and Guiso (2000) and references
therein, that show that there is strong evidence of multiple lending relationships.
5Note that an alternative and perhaps more intuitive measure would be to consider
Xt;i =
hR 1
0 (Lt;i;j   Lt 1;i;j)
1  1
% dj
i 1
1  1
% . In that case equation (11) becomes Lt;i;j = P1
K=0 
kEt[Qt;t+kRt+k;i;j ]hR 1
0 (
P1
K=0
kEt[Qt;t+kRt+k;i;j ])
1 %i1=(1 %)
! %
Xt;i+ Lt 1;i;j . That would imply the bank problem,
to be explained next, is not recursive, thus the loan interest rate decision would not be time consistent
(see Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2006) for more details). We present the solution for both the
discretionary and the full commitment cases in the a technical appendix available from the authors upon
request.
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is given by Rt;i =
hR 1
0
(Rt;i;j)
1 %
dj
i 1
1 %
. Using this denition we have that the demand
for loans from rm i to bank j is given by
Lt;i;j =

Rt;i;j
Rt;i
 %
Xt;i + Lt 1;j : (11)
Similar in nature to Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2006), the parameter  de-
termines how relevant the previous level of loans are to determine the current demand
of loans for each bank j, altering the interest rate elasticity of credit demand6. Under
a standard switching cost framework, loan demand is interest rate insensitive as long
as the increase in cost does not trigger a switch, or the interest rate move is within a
threshold. From equation (11) we observe that a higher  implies that a higher portion
of the demand is interest rate insensitive, independent of the interest rate move, thus
reproducing a case of greater switching costs (a wider threshold). Note that the condition
above also implies that Rt;iXt;i =
R 1
0
Rt;i;j (Lt;i;j   Lt 1;j) dj: Rearranging and using
the loan payment clearing condition we have that
Z 1
0
Rt;i;j
Rt;i
Lt;i;j = Xt;i + 
Z 1
0
Rt;i;j
Rt;i
Lt 1;jdj =WtHi;t + PtIi;t: (12)
2.3 Banking Sector
Each bank j 2 [0; 1] gets deposits from the household and lends money to the each rm
i in the form of loans (Lt;i;j). The rate on deposits is the short term rate set by the
Central Bank Rt;CB . Bank j nominal prots, which are part of the household budget
constraint, are given by
Bt;j = Rt;jLt;j  Rt;CBDt;j ;
where Rt;j = Rt;i;j ; Lt;j =
R 1
0
(Lt;i;j) di:
The balance sheet clearing condition implies Lt;j = Dt;j . Let the bank's j spread be
6As a referee pointed out the assumption of monopolistic competition may be unrealistic, as this
requires a large number of banks. For reasons of parsimony, we don't consider strategic eects that may
arise when the number of banks in the economy is small. (See for instance evidence presented in Farinha
and Santos (2002) who show that about 70 percent of rms have only one lending relationship and
96 percent have relationships with no more than three banks in Portugal. Petersen and Rajan (1994)
report similar results for the US.) Although these strategic eects may be important, and we aim at
incorporating them in future research, the simple framework here under monopolistic competition allows
us to study the impact of the hold-up cost on the macroeconomy. As discussed by Degryse and Ongena
(2008) this cost is a key consequence of lending relationships.
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given by t;j =
Rt;j
Rt;CB
, and let the average spread of the banking sector be t =
Rt
Rt;CB
,
where Rt =
R 1
0
(Rt;i) di. Prots then become
Bt;j = (Rt;j  Rt;CB)Lt;j = (t;j   1)Lt;jRt;CB =
(t;j   1)
t
Lt;jRt:
Bank's j problem, therefore, is to maximize prots subject to the demand constraint,
which, considering all rms are equal, is given by Lt;j =

Rt;j
Rt
 %
Xt+ Lt 1;j . We also
assume that banks and households discount the future in the same way. Formally,
max
t;j ;Lt;i;j
Bt;j = Et
1X
t=0
Q0;t
(
(t;j   1)
t
Lt;jRt + t
"
t;j
t
 %
Xt + Lt 1;j   Lt;j
#)
:
3. Equilibrium
The equilibrium of the economy is dened as the vector of Lagrange multipliers ft;tg,
the allocation set fCt;Ht;Kt+1; Lt;Mt+1; Yt; Dtg, and the vector of prices fPi;t, Pt, Wt,
t;jg such that the household, the nal good rm, intermediate rms and banks maxi-
mization problems are solved, and the market clearing conditions hold.
The consumer problem is represented by the following rst order conditions
Et
 
Rt;CBC
 
t+1
t+1
!
= C t (13)
Ht
C t
=
Wt
Pt
: (14)
Where t+1 = Pt+1=Pt. The goods market clearing condition is given by
Yt = Ct + It: (15)
The capital and labour market clearing condition are given by
Kt =
Z 1
0
Ki;tdi and Ht =
Z 1
0
Hi;tdi: (16)
Using the conditions above, investment evolves according to
It = Kt+1   (1  )Kt: (17)
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Since the households own the rms and banks and receive their prots/dividends we
use the consumption Euler equation and set the nominal discount factor (or the pricing
kernel) to be the ratio of the marginal utilities adjusted to ination (the real discount
factor to rms and banks is therefore equal to the ratio of marginal utilities). Therefore,
we can write
Qt;t+1 = Et
 
C t+1
t+1C
 
t
!
=
1
RCB;t
:
Given that the purpose of our analysis is not to look at the eects of rm-specic
capital, we assume that there exist capital markets within rms. As rms must borrow
to invest in newly produced capital, the price of capital in this market is RtPt. That
way all rms will have the same labour-capital ratio and t;i = t for all i, as in the
case where a capital rental market is available. The net aggregate investment in (new)
capital is then acquired from the nal good producer. Note that, as shown by Woodford
(2005) and Sveen and Weinke (2007), the relevant dierence of considering rm-specic
capital is that the parameter  in the Phillips curve (equation (26d)) would be lower,
increasing price stickiness. Our results are not qualitatively aected by this change7.
Based on that, the price setting equation is given by solving (8), substituting for the
stochastic discount factor and using t+s;i = t+s. That gives
pi;t =
"
"  1
Et
P1
s=0
C t+s
C t
(!)st+sYt+s (
Qs
k=1 t+k)
"

Et
P1
s=0
C t+s
C t
(!)sYt+s (
Qs
k=1 t+k)
" 1
 ; (18)
where, pi;t = Pi;t=Pt and
1 = (1  !)p1 "i;t + !" 1t : (19)
From the rm cost minimization problem, we obtain the demand for capital and
labour. After rearranging the rst order conditions and substituting for the stochastic
discount factor Qt;t+1, we obtain the following equilibrium conditions
8
7The derivation and simulation results are presented in a separate note available from the authors
upon request.
8Once again we have used the fact that marginal costs are the same across rms.
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t =
RtWtHt
PtYt(1  ) (20)
Rt = Et

t+1
RCB;t

t+1
Yt+1
Kt+1
+ (1  )Rt+1

. (21)
As conditions (20) and (21) reveal, when both cost channels of labour and investment
are present, the real marginal costs of the rm will be a function of both current and
future expected short term rates.
The bank spread is determined by prot margin, using the banks rst order conditions
and credit market conditions at the symmetric equilibrium, and letting lt = Lt=Pt we
obtain
ltRt = %t(lt    lt 1
t
); (22)
t =
(t   1)
t
Rt + Et

t+1
Rt;CB

; (23)
lt =
WtHt
Pt
+ It: (24)
Equation (23) exhibits the eects of lending relationships onto the loan interest rate
decision. The Lagrange multiplier on the loan demand equation, t, is equal to the bank's
marginal gain to an extra unit of loan demand. Given that  > 0, then an extra unit
of demand today increases prots due to the current period gain (rst term) and the
discounted future period gains from the additional relationships formed today (second
term). Using equations (23) and (22), we obtain an expression for prot margins
Rt  Rt;CB
Rt;CB
=
(t   1)
t
=
lt
%

lt    lt 1t
   1
Rt
Et

t+1
Rt;CB

: (25)
Therefore, the prot margin of the banks is determined by two forces, one being the
elasticity of the current loan demand and the other being the dynamic eect arising
due to expected leading relationships. The rst part of expression (25) describes the
eects of existing lending relationships on the prot margin. The elasticity of demand
is determined by % (the elasticity of substitution across lenders) and the evolution of
demand for loans given by lt
(lt  lt 1t )
. If the past demand for credit was high, the bank
can exploit those existing relationships to increase prot margins, that is, the demand
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becomes highly inelastic. The second part of expression (25), 1RtEt
h
t+1
Rt;CB
i
; describes
dynamic eects due to expected prots from forming new lending relationships. The bank
will increase the banking spread when its eect on the current marginal gain (positive) is
greater than the eect on the future marginal gain (negative, due to the decrease in the
number of future relationships), and decrease it otherwise. Although the introduction
of banking relationships in our model is done in a reduced form, this trade-o faced by
the bank highlights the main characteristics of relationship lending. On the one hand,
banks will decrease rates to attract more rms, thus rms have a benet by entering in
a long-term agreement. On the other hand, rms might face higher spreads in the future
due to the hold up costs when the bank's incentive to form relationships diminishes. In
the Appendix we present a simple asymmetric information model that delivers equivalent
expressions for prot margins, emphasizing that asymmetric information in loan markets
is able to generate forward looking behavior in bank mark-ups. We stress that the forward
looking behavior in mark-ups has nontrivial implications not only for macroeconomic
outcomes but also for economic stability.
3.1 The Linearized Model
The linear model for the set of variables
nbct; brt; bt; byt; bt;bit;bkt+1;bht;blt; bt; brCB;t; bto is
summarized as follows
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bct = Et (bct+1)  1

Et [brt;CB   bt+1] (26a)
brt =  brt;CB + bt+1 (26b)
+(1  (1  ))Et
hbyt+1 + bt+1   bkt+1i+  (1  )Et (brt+1)
bt = brt + (1 + )bht + bct   yt (26c)
bt = Et (bt+1) + bt (26d)
byt = scbct + sIbit (26e)
bkt+1 = (1  )bkt + bit (26f)
byt = bkt + (1  )bht (26g)
bt = sL
(sL   sI)
blt   sI
(sL   sI)
bit   byt + brt (26h)
blt + brt   bt = 1
(1  )
hblt   blt 1 + bti (26i)

(  1)brt   1(  1)brCB;t = 1(1  )Et [bt   bt+1 + brCB;t] (26j)
bt = brt   brCB;t (26k)
where  = (1  !)(1  !)=!; sc = C=Y , sI = I=Y and sL = l=Y .  is the banking
spread at steady state and r = = the steady state loan rate.
We close the model by assuming the Central Bank sets the reference rate according
to
brt;CB = ybyt + bt + rbrt 1;CB :
It has been extensively argued that such monetary policy rules, where the monetary
authority reacts to ination and output gap, are remarkably successful for stabilization
purposes. Hence, section 5 of the paper focuses on the implications of strengthening
lending relationships to the determinacy properties of the model economy given dierent
monetary policy rules. Apart from the parameter that govern the lending relationships
() and the monetary rule parameters (y, , r) the benchmark model has nine free
parameters: , , , sc, sI , , , ! and .
We set the parameter of intertemporal elasticity of substitution  = 1 and the pa-
rameter of intertemporal elasticity of labour supply  = 1:03: The discount factor, , is
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calibrated to be 0.99, which is equivalent to an annual steady state real interest rate of 4
percent. Following Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) we set the annual banking spread
at steady state to 2 percentage points or  = 1:005. The depreciation rate, , is set
equal to 0:05 per quarter. We set  = 0:36 which roughly implies a steady state share
of labour income in total output of 65%. The share of steady state consumption (sc) is
set equal to 0:725, while the share of steady state investment (sI) is set equal to 0:275.
Using the credit market clearing condition one can establish the relationship between
the share of loans and investment at the steady state. Finally, we set the value of the
Calvo parameter ! (fraction of rms which do not adjust their prices) as equal to 0:66
consistent with the ndings reported in Gali and Gertler (1999).
4. Banking Spread and the Propagation of Shocks
In our model the strength of the lending relationship is represented by the size of the
variable . High  implies that a rm is more attached to the set of banks that have
oered them loans in the past, making the demand for loans less interest rate elastic. This
in turn increases the market power of banks. Given that very little empirical research
has been done on banking spreads movements, bank relationships and macroeconomic
uctuations we guide our parameter choice to match the initial response in banking
spread after a negative ination shock to be around 100 basis points (yearly) following
the empirical evidence presented by Santos and Winton (2008). In view of that, we set
 = 0:659.
In order to facilitate the comparison of our impulse response analysis to those in the
literature (e.g. Woodford (2003) and Curdia and Woodford (2008)), we set the benchmark
Taylor Rule parameters as follows:  = 2, y = 0:5 and r = 0. We rst look at the
economy's response to four standard types of shocks: a taste shock directly associated
with the consumption Euler equation, an investment shock that reects an unexpected
boost in investment, an ination (or supply) shock associated with the New Keynesian
Phillips Curve and nally a policy shock to the Taylor Rule. The vector of shocks is
dened as t = ["c;t; "I;t; ";t; "r;t]
0. All four shock processes are assumed to have an
autocorrelation coecient equal to 0:75; their standard deviations are set equal to 1%.
Given that our model explicitly includes a banking sector we can also consider a nancial
9Note that  has important implications for model stability. We study the stability properties of our
model in detail in the next section.
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sector shock that can be interpreted as a banking capital shock or temporary change to
bank regulation that aects the bank loan rate decision. We start the analysis by looking
at the cyclical properties of banking spreads.
4.1 Cyclical Properties of Banking Spreads
Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero (2011) nd evidence in support of the countercyclical banking
spreads (or as they refer to, price-cost margins) using data on the United States bank-
ing sector for the period 1984-2005. Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) rationalize
the impact of variations of banking spreads inuencing the real economy with the use
of costly state verication. However, as that empirical result holds after controlling for
credit risk, monetary policy and the term structure of interest rates, there should be
further factors driving the cyclical properties of spreads. Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero (2010)
consider a real business cycle model with deep habits and exible prices and show that
productivity shocks indeed can yield countercyclical banking spreads. Here, we inves-
tigate whether lending relationships in the presence of an active monetary policymaker
can also rationalize countercyclical banking spreads.10
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Figure 2 shows the output and banking spread responses to our four main shocks.
After a demand shock (investment shock), output increases, while the banking spread
decreases. This is consistent to the view that banks take advantage of periods of rela-
tively high output to build relationships, decreasing mark-ups to attract rms, since they
recognize that the current rate decision aects future loan demand.
On the other hand, after an ination (cost-push) shock, output decreases and interest
rate margins increase. When output decreases, banks take advantage of the lending
relationships. They have an incentive to increase the banking spread. This bank practice
of exploiting lending relationships is veried empirically by Schenone (2009) and Santos
and Winton (2008). The latter, using rm level data in the United States, nd that rms
without access to corporate bond market face banking spread increases of up to 95 basis
points in a recession, while for rms with bond market access, the spread can increase
up to 28 basis points. In Europe, where lending relationships are more common these
10For the sake of brevity we do not report correlations and standard deviations. These are available
upon request.
17
numbers could be even greater.
In our simulations, after an ination shock, spreads increase annually by roughly 100
basis points. We also conrm countercyclical spreads after both a taste shock and a
contractionary monetary policy (Taylor Rule) shock. In both cases, output decreases
and banks once again exploit credit relationships by increasing the spread.
In order to gain more understanding on how spreads move one can combine (26i) and
(26j) to obtain the solution for the spread deviation bt, which is given by
1bt = 2brCB;t + 1
1  


1   (
blt+1  blt) + 
1   (bt+1   bt)  (bt+1 + brCB;t+1)

(27)
where 1 =

( 1)   11  ; 2 = 1+1  are positive. The reason as to why spreads
move strongly when the shock hits the economy and even overshoots the initial move
generating opposite spread deviations, is due to the assumption that relationships last
only one quarter. After a negative ination shock banks initially exploit already formed
relationships by increasing spreads. In the subsequent periods, given that relationships
are formed after the shock rst occurred, they no longer aect the interest setting decision
for  > t+1. In those periods, spreads are only determined by the expected evolution of
the loan demand. In Section 4.6. we consider an extension of the model with persistent
lending relationships that last for four periods.
4.2 Endogenous Spreads, Output and Monetary Policy
In order to identify the impact of lending relationships, and the endogenous spread
movements it generates, onto the main variables of the economy we compare the impulse
responses of a model with constant spread, setting  = 0, and our benchmark model
with  = 0:65. We rstly look at output responses. Spread movements amplify output
responses to all shocks (Figure 3). Under a model with constant banking spread, output
decreases after a standard cost-push shock. However, if banks try to exploit existing
lending relationships by increasing spreads, output will decrease even further. Higher
loan rates imply a direct increase on the cost of hiring labour and investing in capital.
This will be followed by further decreases in investment and labour demand leading to
lower output levels.
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[Insert Figure 3 about here]
The opposite holds true for an investment shock, which leads to an initial rise in
credit demand and output. An increase in credit demand gives banks an incentive to
form new relationships by decreasing spreads. Decreasing spreads imply lower labour
and investment costs and hence boosts production.
After a contractionary monetary shock, output will be lower in the case of lending
relationships relative to the case of constant spreads for a number of periods. Spread
movements are more persistent in this case, leading to a further deterioration of output.
In the case of investment, ination and taste shocks, however, spreads converge to their
steady-state value and output responses are similar in both scenarios with and without
lending relationships.
Existence of lending relationships contributes signicantly towards output amplica-
tion. In our simulations the amplication eects are in the order of 10% with respect
to the baseline case without lending relationships. In our model, loan rates directly
inuence the rm's costs of production. As a result, as banks use their market power
by moving spreads countercyclically to maximize prots, they reinforce the variations in
production costs after the shock, leading to greater output responses. The amplication
of output occurs at the time the shock impacts the economy. Once again, amplication
occurs because we model lending relationships to last only one quarter. Hence, spreads
deviate from their steady state level only during this rst period. In Section 4.6 we will
allow relationships to aect lending for up to four quarters.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
Figure 4 (a) shows the banking loan rate movement after the shocks in the constant
spread case ( = 0) and lending relationship case ( = 0:65). As expected, when banking
spreads move, so do the loan rates. However, spread deviations are always greater than
the actual dierence between the loan rates when comparing the  = 0 and 0:65 cases.
Under the existence of lending relationships, spreads increase by roughly 25 basis points
(in a quarter) after an ination shock; the net dierence between loan rate and the Central
Bank is by about 12=13 basis points. The policymaker, knowing that the banks will
exploit the existing relationships after an adverse ination shock, avoids an excessively
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tight monetary policy due to its output concerns.
This observation becomes clear in Figure 4 (b) that shows how the Central Bank
base rate responds to the four main shocks. As loan rates increase after the shock, the
Central Bank moves the base rate osetting some of this increase and thereby dampens
the potential eect of endogenous banking spreads on the real economy. Nonetheless, as
we have seen, output responses are still amplied. While monetary policy actively tries
to oset spread movements, it can not do so completely. An increase in loan rates leads to
more volatile output responses. Ination, however, does not change as much, following
a similar path in both constant spread and lending relationships cases. The change
in monetary policy does not generate increasing inationary pressures. The Taylor Rule
endogenously accommodates movements in spread without having to target the evolution
of spreads.
Two important aspects of this result should be highlighted. First, the base inter-
est rate (or monetary policy stance), responds quite dierently to shocks depending on
whether lending relationships are in place or not. Thus, if the Central Bank is uncertain
whether these relationships are strong or not, it may set an incorrect interest rate path,
therefore failing to stabilize output gap and ination. De Fiore and Tristani (2008) obtain
a similar conclusion while looking at a monetary policy that tracks the natural rate in a
model with and without credit frictions. Their model incorporates the nancial accelera-
tor into a standard New Keynesian model. They nd that credit frictions imply dierent
natural rate dynamics and dierent monetary policy responses. Once again, their results
are similar to the ones presented here, though the channel is dierent. While spreads in
our model evolve due to lending relationships, in De Fiore and Tristani (2008) spreads
move due to changes in the rm's net worth.
Second, we nd that even though a standard Taylor Rule implies an endogenous
reaction of the monetary policy towards variations in the spread, this is not sucient
to fully deal with the impact of the loan rate changes. In other words, standard Taylor
rules can not fully oset the amplication eects of spread movements that are generated
by the presence of lending relationships. Therefore, in the following section we look into
two alternative policy rules, augmenting the original Taylor Rule with banking spreads
and with credit aggregates.11
11An issue that is important to consider in future research is the presence of the zero bound problem.
When the economy is operating at the zero bound of policy rates, a negative macroeconomic shock may
be further amplied by the movements of the bank mark-ups as the policymaker cannot o-set the prot
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4.3 Alternative Monetary Policy Rules
Taylor (2008) advocates that the Central Bank base rate should respond not only to
output gap and ination deviations but also to changes in the banking spread. Such
framework allows the Central Bank to accommodate changes in the banking/nancial
sector conditions. This adjusted Taylor Rule takes into consideration the movements in
the base rate that impacts the consumption through the Euler equation and the loan
rate, which impact production and investment costs. The spread-adjusted Taylor Rule
is given by
brt;CB = ybyt + bt + rbrt 1;CB   bt;
For 0 <  < 1, the Central Bank targets a hybrid rate that is a weighted average of
the loan rate and the Central Bank base rate. If  = 1, then the Central Bank in fact
targets the loan rate instead of the base rate in the economy. We present the results for
 = 0:5 and  = 1; while keeping the other Taylor Rule parameters unchanged ( = 2,
y = 0:5 and r = 0). Figure 5 shows impulse responses after an exogenous ination and
an exogenous investment shock.
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
When the monetary policy responds to banking spread changes, the previously ob-
served output amplication is oset. After an ination shock, the Central Bank base rate
does not increase as much as when the original Taylor Rule is considered; in this way
the reduction in output is actually smaller than when the Central Bank does not target
the spread. Note that in the case of the ination shock, the smaller output deviation is
not \paid" by more inationary pressures. Although ination initially increases more,
it is less persistent, falling down faster to its steady state level. After an investment
shock, output does not increase as much as when a basic Taylor Rule is considered; so
a monetary policy that adjusts to spread movements is able to oset the inationary
impact of lower banking spreads. The spread-adjusted Taylor Rule also delivers a lower
initial ination response, although now the ination response is atter. In other words,
although under a standard Taylor Rule monetary policy implicitly responds to banking
spread movements, adjusting the monetary rule to include the banking spread improves
margins.
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economic stabilization.
Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2007) present a model that introduces nominal
lending contracts. They argue that including a measure of broad money into a standard
Taylor Rule results in less volatile output. Therefore, we analyze the case of an ination
and an investment shock, when monetary policy follows a credit-adjusted Taylor Rule
that includes an additional term of real credit aggregates (lt).
brt;CB = ybyt + bt + rbrt 1;CB + lblt;
As in the previous case, we set y = 0:5, y = 2 and r = 0:5.
[Insert Figure 6 about here]
Credit aggregates deviations are closely related to deviations in output, since the
credit demand is determined by investment and labour nance requirements. Hence,
increasing l from zero to 0:4 would lead to similar monetary policy responses as if the
Taylor Rule parameter on output has increased (see Figure 6). After an ination shock,
output does not decrease as much, but ination increases substantially more than in the
case of the standard Taylor Rule. After an investment shock, output does not increase
as much, but ination drops considerably more. Note that, as we increase l, holding
y constant, indeterminacy obtains. In order to obtain a unique solution, we increase r
from zero to 0:5 (see Aksoy, Basso, and Coto-Martinez (2011) for a detailed discussion
of indeterminacy due to the cost channel of monetary policy). We, therefore, conclude
that credit-adjusted rule is less successful in terms of stabilization and is susceptible to
indeterminacy issues.
4.4 Banking/Financial Shocks
Our model considers a type of nancial sector friction generated by lending relationships.
As we explicitly model the banking sector, we can consider an alternative shock, a banking
spread shock, that we interpret as a banking capital shock or a temporary change in bank
regulations that impact the bank's loan rate decision via a change in the marginal gain
of an extra unit of loan demand (equation (26j)).
[Insert Figure 7 about here]
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We present our results in Figure 7. A positive banking shock leads to an increase in the
spread and a decrease in investment and output. At the same time, ination increases
slightly due to cost-push eects of the increased marginal costs. Therefore, modifying the
monetary policy by a spread-adjusted Taylor Rule does not seem to generate improved
stabilization as measured by output and ination. If the shock is not persistent, respond-
ing to spreads reduces the output contraction at the cost of an inationary pressure.
Targeting spread movements in this case is equivalent to a Central Bank more con-
cerned with output than ination. Given the forward looking nature of the inationary
process, initial drive to decrease the base rate as spread increases, leads to high ina-
tionary pressures. Taking that into account actually means that, the base rate does not
decrease as much as in the case when monetary policy is set based on the standard Taylor
Rule. If shocks are very persistent, this forward looking element is very strong. Here,
the Central Bank, that takes the banking spread into consideration to set policy, seems
to deliver a high ination rate but less output loss. Figure 7 shows the impulse responses
for both cases, when shocks have a low persistence ( = 0:3) and a high persistence
( = 0:75). Note that a similar result obtains when a credit-adjusted Taylor Rule is
considered.
4.5 Monetary Policy Rules and Welfare
While spread-adjusted Taylor Rules seem to perform better than standard Taylor Rules
in stabilizing macroeconomic shocks, targeting credit aggregates is less successful. In
view of that, we employ Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a) methodology to quantify the
welfare costs of alternative policy rules and test whether spread-adjusted Taylor Rules
improve welfare. To this end, we write the non-linear equilibrium conditions in the
following format
Et(yt+1; yt; xt+1; xt) = 0;
where yt contains the non-predetermined variables of the model and xt contains the
endogenous predetermined variables (x1t ) and the exogenous shocks (x
2
t ). Given our
interest in policy rules, we exclude the Taylor Rule shock and set x2t = ["c;t; "I;t; ";t; "b;t]
0,
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where the last term is the banking sector shock. Furthermore we assume that
x2t+1 = x
2
t +fezt;
where  stands for the persistence of shocks and fe stands for the standard deviation of
shocks12.  scales standard deviations and zt is an iid shock. The economy's welfare is
given by the household's conditional expectation of lifetime utility, V0, given by
V0 = Et
1X
t=0
t
 
C1 t
1     
H1+t
1 + 
!
:
By including V0 as one of the variables in the vector yt, the solution to the system is
given by yt = g(xt;) and xt+1 = h(xt;) + ezt. Finally, the non-stochastic steady
state is given by xt = x and  = 0.
As in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a), we dene the welfare cost of adopting an
alternative policy regime a compared to a policy regime r (a pure ination targeting
regime) as a portion of consumption WC such that the household would be indierent
between these two policies. Formally,
V ar = Et
1X
t=0
t

(Cat )
1 
1     
(Hat )
1+
1 + 

= Et
1X
t=0
t

((1 WC)Crt )1 
1     
(Hrt )
1+
1 + 

:
Then, using the fact that the rst derivative of the policy function g with respect to
 evaluated at the steady state (xt = x and  = 0) is zero (see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2004b)), the welfare cost can be approximated to
Welfare Cost =WC(x; 0) =  (1  )

@2V a
@@

(x;0)
  @
2V r
@@

(x;0)

2
2
:
We present a model with cost channels of monetary policy, in which, contrary to
standard New Keynesian models, policymakers face a trade-o between stabilizing the
ination rate and stabilizing the output gap (see the discussion in Ravenna and Walsh
(2006)). This creates a policy bias towards a more aggressive ination stabilization. As
our focus is on the welfare impact of including additional terms dependent on credit
market measures, we x the value of  = 2 and measure welfare changes by varying
12We kept persistence equal to 0.75 and standard deviation of 1% for all shocks.
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other policy rule parameters13, therefore
brt;CB = 2bt + ybyt + rbrt 1;CB   bt
brt;CB = 2bt + ybyt + rbrt 1;CB + lblt:
Table 1: Monetary Policy Rule - Welfare Analysis
r = 0 r = 1
 
0 0.5 1 0 0.5 1
0 0.00%y 0.01% 0.02% 0.00%y 0.04% 0.06%
0.1 0.00% 0.01% 0.02% 0.03% 0.05% 0.07%
y 0.2 -0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.05% 0.06% 0.07%

0.3 -0.06% -0.05% -0.04% 0.05% 0.06% 0.07%
0.4 -0.17% -0.16% -0.15% 0.05% 0.05% 0.06%
0.5 -0.45% -0.43% -0.42% 0.03% 0.04% 0.04%
l l
0 0.2 0.4 0 0.2 0.4
0 0.000%y -0.058% -2.263% 0.000%y 0.068% -0.053%
0.1 0.002% -0.195% -26.087% 0.032% 0.051% -0.125%
y 0.2 -0.012% -0.545% -
 0.047% 0.025% -0.229%
0.3 -0.057% -1.670% - 0.052% -0.015% -0.389%
0.4 -0.169% -8.068% - 0.046% -0.074% -0.642%
0.5 -0.446% - - 0.030% -0.163% -1.072%
y Indicates the reference policy for that quadrant, thus deviation equals zero
 Indicates the best set of policy parameters for that quadrant
 A dash indicates there was no unique equilibrium for these policy parameters.
Table 1 shows welfare costs (WC) for dierent policy parameter combinations. We
set the reference policy, for which WC = 0, to be the rst entry in each quadrant, where
 = y = l = 0. For each value of output coecient (y), increasing  (the response to
banking spread changes) increases welfare. Note that, welfare costs are always increasing
in each row for the two top quadrants. The welfare analysis presented here suggests that
a welfare maximizing Central Bank should target the loan rate, by setting  = 1, rather
than the Central Bank base rate ( = 0) or the average of the two rates ( = 0:5). This
is because lending relationships introduce a dynamic distortion in credit markets, since
they give incentives to banks to vary spreads and thereby move the economy further
away from the steady state. When the base rate responds directly to spread movements,
the Central Bank is able to partially oset this distortion, increasing welfare.
Table 1 also shows that targeting credit aggregates does not improve welfare. The
13We also run simulations for lower and higher values of  . The conclusions of the welfare analysis
remain the same.
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only case where it is optimal to target credit aggregates is when the policy rule is set
with inertia. In this case, targeting credit aggregates replaces targeting output as a more
ecient way to maximize welfare.
4.6 Persistent Spread Movements
Until now, we assumed that lending relationships last only one period. The empirical
evidence suggests that although relationships are occasionally broken, they usually last
for longer periods (see Ongena and Smith (2001)). In view of that, we modify our model
allowing relationships to lasts for up to 4 quarters. Here, we assume the nancial part
of the rm cares about a measure Xt;i of loans given by
Xt;i =
Z 1
0
(Lt;i;j   1Lt 1;j   2Lt 2;j   3Lt 3;j   4Lt 4;j)1 
1
% dj
 1
1  1
%
:
As a result, we obtain the demand for loans and the bank maximization conditions
stated below.
Lt;i;j =

Rt;i;j
Rt;i
 %
Xt;i + 1Lt 1;j + 2Lt 2;j + 3Lt 3;j + 4Lt 4;j
t =
(t   1)
t
Rt + Et [Qt;t+11t+1 +Qt;t+22t+2 +Qt;t+33t+3 +Qt;t+44t+4] :
The nal set of equations are then modied such that (26i) includes all lagged loan
deviations l^t k; for k = 1; 2; 3 and 4 and (26j) includes all forward looking shadow
marginal prot measures ^t+k. Therefore, we derive the expression for the spread devi-
ation bt, that is comparable to equation (27), and is given by14
~1bt = ~2brCB;t+ 1
1 P4
k=1
k

1
1 4
 
2
P3
k=1
Pk
z=1 
k(4 (k z+1))(blt+4 k+bt+4 k) (28)
 [P3k=0(4 k)+2P4 k 1z=1 k(4 k z)](blt k+bt k) P4k=1 k(bt+k+brCB;t+k)+P4k=2 brCB;t+k 1
[Insert Figure 8 about here]
Figure 8 shows impulse responses after an ination shock of the modied model against
14Where ~1 =

( 1)   11 P4
k=1
k
; ~2 =
1+
P4
k=1 
k
1 P4
k=1
k
.
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the case when no lending relationships are present15. For these simulations, we set
1 = 2 = 3 = 4 = 0:175. As it is clear, spread movements are more persistent,
remaining positive for four quarters. As a result, there is a more pronounced hump-
shaped response of the Central Bank base rate, osetting the endogenous tightening
caused by the spread movements. There is also more persistent amplication of output
lasting for the periods for which the banking relationships are in eect. By comparing
expression (28) with (27) we can see also the reason for the increased persistence in the
behavior of macroeconomic variables. Under this scenario a decrease in loan demand, blt;
impacts positively the spread variation for consecutive four quarters; spread deviations
are negative only after the fth period.
5. (In)Determinacy Analysis
We now turn to the analysis of the implications of lending relationships for the deter-
minacy properties of our model economy. As it is well known, the policymaker needs to
select appropriate policy rule parameters to stabilize ination and output gap to ensure
local model stability. To provide a comprehensive discussion, we consider the standard
Taylor Rule and the two rules discussed in the previous sections in which the Central
Bank targets banking spreads or credit aggregates.
We show that the range of policy rules support three possible outcomes: i) a unique
solution, ii) multiple equilibria (sun spots) and iii) no solution. Of course, our interest
is to determine the policy rules that deliver a unique solution. We will rst concentrate
on the standard Taylor Rule, where the main policy parameters of interest are , y and
r.
In Figures 9 and 10, we report determinacy areas for dierent combinations of values
for y and r, and we vary  from 0 to 2 and  from 0 to 1. The dark grey shaded areas
show the no solution cases, the light grey shows the region where the model has a unique
solution and the white area shows the multiple equilibria cases. We report three positive
results and a normative discussion on alternative policy rules.
[Insert Figures 9 and 10 about here]
First, in all four cases depicted in Figure 9, in the presence of strong lending rela-
15We do not present other shocks since the qualitative conclusions remain the same.
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tionships, it is very dicult to design a Taylor Rule that ensures model stability. When
the Central Bank cares about ination deviations a value of  greater than around 0.75
(sometimes lower) implies our economy does not have a unique equilibrium. The under-
lying intuition is quite simple. If lending relationships are strong ( very large), banking
spreads are more volatile. Assume agents become very pessimistic and reduce consump-
tion/investment, then the economy could move into a recession; the initial reduction
in consumption/investment becomes a \self-fullling prophecy". The remedy to self-
fullling prophecies in standard NK models is a policy rule that prescribes an aggressive
cut in interest rates to anchor ination expectations. In our model, given the reduction
in consumption and investment, banks anticipate a decline in the credit demand; they
respond by increasing their mark-up from existing borrowers. Even if the base rate de-
creases, the sharp spread increase leads to a higher loan rates and higher rm marginal
costs. As a consequence aggregate output contracts. Thus, if the Central Banks follows
a standard Taylor Rule, it can not avoid the recession, since the reduction in the base in-
terest rate is dominated by the increase in the banking spread. The standard mechanism
that ensures determinacy is no longer in place, even if the base rate responds strongly to
ination deviations.
Second, Figures 9(c) and 9(d) show the cases where the Central Bank does not tar-
get output with and without interest rate smoothing. We show that the Central Bank
needs to be very aggressive towards ination to ensure determinacy. Targeting output
reduces the area of stability. This is a consequence of the presence of the cost chan-
nels in the model. As discussed by Aksoy, Basso, and Coto-Martinez (2011) in a model
with cost channels like ours, a contractionary policy change leads to a contraction of the
economy but two opposing implications for ination, one through aggregate demand and
one through the cost channel. Thus, targeting output together with ination requires
the determinacy concerned policymaker to act in order to make sure the aggregate de-
mand channel dominates the cost channel. Related to this result, introducing base rate
smoothing generally helps to ensure stability. If we compare Figures 9 (a) and 9 (b), we
observe that the elimination of the persistence parameter signicantly reduces the area
of stability. However, note that, although mildly, interest inertia worsens the impact of
lending relationships; indeterminacy obtains for lower values of  in Figure 9 (a) relative
to 9 (b). This occurs because as banking spreads move, the base interest rate must
move strongly in the opposite direction to curb the change on the nal borrowing rate.
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Given interest rate inertia this sharp base rate movement does not materialize leading
more frequently to indeterminacy problems. Hence, interest inertia mildly reinforces the
impact of lending relationships on indeterminacy but provides considerable more room
for the policy maker to be less aggressive towards ination relative to output.
Third, Figure 10 (a) shows the eects of the combinations of increasing  and the
steady state banking mark-up . We initially set  = 1:005 implying an annual banking
spread of 2 percentage points based on a model calibrated for the U.S. However, in
some economies where competition in the banking sector is weaker this number can be
considerably higher. Higher steady state spread levels imply that indeterminacy occurs
for lower levels of . Thus, indeterminacy problems are worsened in economies with
lending relationships associated with high average spread levels. When the prot margin
is large and the lending relationships have strong inuence in banking spreads ( is large),
the Central Bank has a very limited power over the nal loan rates. As a result bank
spread movements dominate base interest rate changes more easily.
On the normative side we nd that to circumvent the indeterminacy problem related
to strong lending relationships, the Central Bank could target the banking spread, in
addition to ination and output gap targeting. As we have shown the monetary rule in
this case takes the following form
brt;CB = ybyt + bt + rbrCBt 1   b:
This targeting rule may be particularly appealing under our set-up with bank distor-
tions represented by the strength of lending relationships (). If the Central Bank base
rate responds directly to spread changes, the nal loan rates will not be dominated by
spread deviations. As a result of that, the Central Bank can anchor ination expecta-
tions and osets self-fullling expectations. As Figure 10 (b) shows, targeting spread
movement does indeed improve the performance of the model in terms of stability.
The other alternative monetary policy rule considered in the previous section includes
a direct term based on credit aggregates. Figure 10 (c) shows that this modied policy
rule does not ameliorate the indeterminacy problem. As discussed before targeting credit
aggregates is very similar to increasing the importance of output movements relative to
ination. Excess output concern implies indeterminacy.
We conclude that active policymaking under lending relationships and endogenous
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banking spreads signicantly alters stability conditions as compared to basic three equa-
tion New Keynesian model. While interest rate smoothing is important for stability
purposes, there is a much less clear-cut case for targeting output gap. One key result of
Taylor-Woodford work is that in setting the short term rates the policymaker needs to
respond more than one to ination changes. Here we document that is not necessarily
the case. Finally, the strength of lending relationships turns out to be crucial in the
determinacy discussion. Strong lending relationships imply less stable economies forcing
the Central Bank to change the policy rule; we show that policy rules that respond to
bank spread are less prone to indeterminacy issues.
6. Conclusions
We present a simple New Keynesian model that incorporates a basic and relevant fea-
ture of nancial intermediation, namely, lending relationships. While such relationships
benet rms through the reduction of information asymmetries, they also create hold-up
costs; rms become locked to a bank, reducing their bargaining power over credit rates.
We report four main ndings.
First, we show that lending relationships can explain observed countercyclical pattern
of bank spreads. This is because banks decrease spreads attempting to form as many
relationships as possible during booms and increase spreads to sustain protability during
recessions, exploiting the rms locked into pre-existing relationships.
Second, lending relationships help to explain the amplication of output responses.
Countercyclical mark-ups serve as a propagation mechanism of shocks hitting the econ-
omy. The Central Bank responds to banking spread changes by decreasing the base
rate relative to its level under constant spreads. Therefore, conrming Goodfriend and
McCallum's (2007) conclusions, monetary policy should take into account nancial in-
termediation and dierent short-term interest rate dynamics in order to stabilize the
economy in a stochastic environment. In our basic set-up the Central Bank base rate
adjustment to spread movements occur indirectly, through the changes in output and
ination. One of the current monetary policy debates is whether the base rate should
respond directly to spread movements. We show that including an additional term de-
pendent on the banking spread improves stabilization of the economy. Targeting credit
aggregates, however, does not improve stabilization performance.
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Third, we show that from a welfare perspective the standard Taylor Rule is suboptimal
under the alternative of bank-spread targeting. Results are less encouraging for policy
rules that respond directly to credit aggregates. Welfare is not improved in this case.
Fourth, our model indicates that strong lending relationships have important equilib-
rium determinacy implications through feedback eects between the nancial interme-
diation and the real economy. An initial shock that decreases output will push banking
spreads up, which further dampen output. If spread movements are signicant the econ-
omy does not converge back to equilibrium. That implies monetary policy should also
be vigilant, responding to banking spread movements, to guarantee equilibrium determi-
nacy.
Our model matches two main empirical ndings: countercyclical spreads and sig-
nicant spread changes during downturns. Naturally, building up lending relationships
from a fully eshed out banking sector based on game theoretical foundations is an im-
portant issue that we intend to pursue in our future research. Nevertheless, we believe
that the simple structure we provide here captures the essential elements of the eects
of relationship banking on macroeconomic performance.
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Appendix
In the appendix we present a simple corporate nance model of asymmetric information
based on Akerlof (1970) that features dynamic behavior of banking mark-ups, which is
an essential element of lending relationships. We assume that every entrepreneur (rm)
lives for two periods. A fraction (1   ) are opportunistic and will default on the loan
after one period. By the end of the rst period, the lender (bank) that issues the loan
will know the type of entrepreneur as a private information. That implies that the lender
will not know whether those rms that are willing to switch lenders are willing to do so
due to opportunistic or competitive price seeking behavior. In equilibrium there will also
be a \market for lemons" leading to the collapse of this market. The outcome will be
that \good" companies, that are competitive price-seekers, will prefer to stay with the
existing lender. Given that \good companies" cannot switch, the lender can price loan
demand monopolistically (R) and retains the surplus over the competitive price, that is
RCB :
We now present the prot of the banks. The demand for loans for each period is equal
to

Rti
Rj
 %
Lt; Lt being the real volume of funds demanded to pay factor inputs. As in the
main text, we assume monopolistic competition between banks. Expression

Rt;i;j
Rt;i
 %
represents the market share of the bank. After one period a fraction  of entrepreneurs
will not default and stay with the existing lender; (RtiRtj )
 %Lt+1 representing the demand
for loans by good entrepreneurs. As in the paper, we also assume that the lender
cannot discriminate between new and old costumers. Intertemporal bank prots, under
discretion, are therefore given by
Bt;j =
1X
t=0
Q0;t
(
tRt;i;j

Rt;i;j
Rt;i
 %
Lt +Rt;i;jt 1

Rt 1;i;j
Rt 1;i
 %
Lt
 Rt;CB
"
Rt;i;j
Rt;i
 %
Lt + t 1

Rt 1;i;j
Rt 1;i
 %
Lt
#)
:
Total demand for loans consists of demand for loans made by new entrepreneurs and
demand due to existing lending relationships. Note that a fraction (1 ) of entrepreneurs
each period default on their loan, and hence bank prots are directly aected by oppor-
tunistic entrepreneurs. As in the main model, the marginal cost is given by Rt;CB : The
prot margin at the symmetric equilibrium is given by
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Rt  Rt;CB
Rt
=
t + t 1
%
+ (1  t) Q0;tRt+1
Rt

Rt+1  Rt+1;CB
Rt+1

t
Lt+1
Lt
:
This expression is equivalent to the prot margin equation (25) under deep habits.
The prot margin is determined by the same eects; i.e. % represents the static banking
mark-up, t 1 represents the fact that banks exploit existing lending relationships to
increase monopoly prots and the expected future prots of forming new lending rela-
tionship are given by Q0;t
Rt+1
Rt

Rt+1 Rt+1;CB
Rt+1

t
Lt+1
Lt
, representing the forward looking
behavior of prot margins: Deep habits in lending capture these dynamics in a parsimo-
nious way.
This simple model shows that the time varying default probability (1 t) aects the
prot margins. (Even when lenders do not have market power, prot margins need to
cover the default losses.) These also aect the expected prots of forming new lending
relationships. We currently investigate a case where the default probabilities are en-
dogenously determined by the value of the entrepreneurs' collateral. For instance, when
the value of the collateral declines, the probability of default will increase, leading to a
decrease in the expected future prots by forming new relationships, therefore lenders
will increase their prot margins. The cyclical evolution of collateral would reinforce the
movements in credit spreads.
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Figures
Figure 1: Commercial and Industrial Loan Rates Spreads over Federal Funds Rate
(Actual and Four-Quarter Moving Average)
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Figure 2: Cyclical Properties of Banking Spread -  = 0.65
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Figure 3: Endogenous Spread and Amplication of Output Responses
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Figure 4: Endogenous Spread and Interest Rate Response
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Figure 5: Spread-Adjusted Taylor Rule
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Figure 6: Credit-Adjusted Taylor Rule
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Figure 7: Banking Shock
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(a) Low Persistence -  = 0:3
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Figure 8: (More) Persistent Spread Movements
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Figure 9: Indeterminacy Analysis - Eect of Firm-Bank Relationship
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(b) Varying  setting - y = 0.5, r = 0
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(c) Varying  setting - y = 0, r = 1
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(d) Varying  setting - y = 0, r = 0
Figure 10: Indeterminacy Analysis - Alternative Steady State Spread and Policy Rules
- Setting  = 2, y = 0.5 and r = 0
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(a) Eect of Increasing Steady State Spread
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(b) Spread-Adjusted Policy Rule
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(c) Credit-Adjusted Policy Rule
